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Abstract
The article investigates the technical rationality behind Bangkok’s recent land use 
zoning plans. It does so through the example of Chinatown. The plans, intended to promote 
urban sustainability, introduce zoning techniques such as (1) land use subcategorization 
to hierarchize urban districts, and (2) density zoning to encourage intensive development 
around transit stations. The case of Chinatown foregrounds the discussion in this article, 
which then, in turn, explores the two zoning techniques. I argue that both techniques are 
formulated through a functionalist rationality, and thus omit place-specific conditions of 
land, such as local practices, histories and land tenure. Worse yet, the landed elite uses 
them to justify displacement and eviction. The article theorizes Chinatown as a space of 
difference, pointing to particularities that are unseen and thus at risk of being unmade by 
what is often passed off as technical expertise.
Introduction
One evening in the year 2012, my friend and I drove back from our dinner in 
Chinatown, a popular dining destination among Bangkok’s middle class. As we drove 
along Charoen Krung Road, I noticed a long banner that had been put up across the 
width of two shophouses. On the long, thin piece of white cloth, in an angry font type, 
was written: ‘This is Chinatown. We do not want the metro. Do not destroy’. I remember 
my near-reflex response that evening: I snorted and said to my friend, dismissively, 
‘Maybe the residents don’t realize this yet, but once the construction is complete, they 
will profit from it’. I read the banner as yet another instance of NIMBYism against rail-
induced density. That reading coincided with my own professional philosophy at that 
time. Between 2009 and 2012, I was an urban planner for the Thai Department of Town 
and Country Planning. As a young, recently graduated planner trained in ‘postmodern 
urbanism’ (cf. Ellin, 1999), I was an advocate for ‘density’ and its companions (walkability, 
variety, vitality, placemaking, etc.). To me, density became a panacea for most if not all 
urban ills. Density was a word that I would put in every policy document I wrote.
My then unquestioned enthusiasm for density was shared by Bangkok Metro-
po li tan Administration (BMA), the city government of Bangkok. In 2013, the BMA 
announced the latest zoning plan. Much anticipated by the public, the plan was believed 
to be a concerted response to the city’s long entrenched problems of uncontrolled 
growth (see Figure 1a). In the 1980s and 1990s, Bangkok’s land use policy (or rather 
the lack thereof ) had consistently failed to keep up with national economic growth, 
the expansion of the middle class, the in-migration of labor from other provinces. The 
absence of a strong land use policy caused a regulatory vacuum that resulted in real 
estate-led suburbanization and industrialization of the urban fringes. Thus, it led to an 
explosion of metropolitan areas beyond Bangkok’s administrative boundary into the 
surrounding provinces. The metropolitan form is large in extent but thin in density. 
The city’s population density is too low to support an extensive, cost-effective public 
transportation. Cars are therefore chosen as a private solution to this very public 
problem. At this particular historical conjuncture, the BMA came to problematize low 
This article is part of my doctoral dissertation research funded by Rackham International Research Awards. I wish to 
thank Jarunee Pimonsathean for pointing me towards important information, and Sirirutt Wongchanthajaroen for 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































density as a culprit behind the fragmented urbanization. The ‘compact city’––the city 
of walkable high-density zones––was seen as the solution.
Meanwhile, in Chinatown, eviction notices abound. Leases are shortened. In 
many cases, they are terminated. The landlords want to profit from the city allowing 
increased building density. However, unlike the familiar geographies of neighborhood 
change, gentrification and eviction (see Ghertner, 2014), the displacement dynamics 
here are not laissez-faire, but actively endorsed by the zoning regime. This requires 
us to re-evaluate the role of technical knowledge in validating state-sanctioned dis-
placement. There is a rich scholarly literature on Chinatown, but one line of inquiry 
that pertains to this article is state intervention in the space of Chinatown. Ander-
son’s important works (1987; 1991) explore the state institutions and processes through 
which Vancouver’s Chinatown was constructed, made and remade from 1857 to 1980. 
The author recounts the shift in dominant discourses, in which the state defined 
Chinatown according to its taste and interest. Chinatown shifted from an unsanitary, 
lowly place to a slum ripe for clearance, and on to a colorful, ethnic neighborhood. In 
a similar vein, Yeoh and Kong (1994) investigate changes in landscape meanings and 
state interventions of Singapore’s Chinatown, which ranged from the modernist 
era, where progress was used to justify demolition, to the present-day postcolonial 
multiracial ism, in which Chinatown constitutes one of the four racialized ‘historic 
districts’. Lin (1998) examines how global forces––for example investment and capital 
flows––impact local development, communities and life in New York City’s Chinatown. 
Although transnational in character, the dynamics are nonetheless mediated through 
local state actors and institutions. For example, the attempt to rezone Chinatown 
to accommodate a high-rise vision of Lower Manhattan was met with resistance (Lin, 
1998: 151–56).
While the Chinatown-as-construction perspective above explores the making 
and remaking of Chinatown, in this article I consider the opposite question: I investigate 
how the particularities of Chinatown are unseen and risk being unmade by one specific 
state intervention: zoning. I theorize zoning as it is currently practiced in Bangkok as 
a technology of unseeing. The technology has many tools: height limits that only regu-
late individual buildings with little regard for the surrounding context, the geometry 
of tran sit density that only sees land in terms of density, and zoning categories that 
see land as land use. Therefore, instead of studying Chinatown as an ethnic settlement, 
I analyze Chinatown as a technical interface through which the ethnic settlement is 
intervened upon.
This article is a result of my fieldwork in Bangkok from January to April 
2015. It draws on government documents such as present and past zoning plans, 
zoning  stand ards, plan implementation manuals and planning petitions, interviews 
with government planners and Chinatown residents, and my attendance of various 
public meetings. It consists of six parts. In the second part, which follows, I outline 
two related theoretical perspectives that inform the analysis of this article. First of 
all, this part draws analytical inspiration from important writings on modernist zoning. 
I pay particular attention to how the state’s intervention in the built environment 
often fails because intervention programs are produced through a limited technical 
rationality. Secondly, such techno-managerial rationality, although almost passé in the 
global North, is still a persistent and dominant mode of planning in the global South. 
Part three introduces Bangkok’s recent zoning plans, which are often touted as the 
‘greenest’ plans of Bangkok. They bring in, for the first time, new zoning techniques 
believed to promote urban sustainability. This third section explores two such zoning 
techniques––land use subcategorization and high-density zoning––and unpacks their 
technical formulation and rationality. The fourth part presents the case of Chinatown. 
I explore the experience of the two zoning techniques as they are implemented on the 
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ground. In particular, I highlight a series of contestations that arise in response. These 
contestations expose the limits and flaws of the universal zoning techniques that do not 
account for the specific conditions of Chinatown. Parts five and six further theorize on 
universal zoning devices as they encounter a space of difference. Here, I discuss how 
universal zoning omits the ‘space of difference’, forgoing local practices and housing 
tenure. Conceived as a neutral, technical intervention, universal zoning does not have 
enough conceptual and ethical room to account for such conditions. Worse yet, it plays 
into the hands of the entrenched landed elite, who use zoning to enable eviction.
Modernism, zoning and technical rationality
Scholars have studied modernist urban planning in various geographical 
regions, highlighting its failure to improve urban conditions. The failure results from 
a narrow technical lens, a select way of seeing, through which urban planners view 
and intervene in urban space, whereby a complex phenomenon is reduced to a set of 
calculable variables and criteria. In his landmark book Seeing like a State (1998) Scott 
provides a detailed historical account of high modernism as a form of state inter vention 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The high-modernist state pro ject is 
characterized by simplified, utilitarian descriptions, a tendency to bring facts in line 
with representations, and a temporal focus on the future, on progress and on linear 
improvement. Most importantly, high modernism ignores history and devalues politics. 
It believes instead that rational thought, scientific laws and administrative criteria can 
provide a single answer. Technical knowledge is made superior to other sources of 
judgment. As a result, one inherent paradox––and one source of failure––is the fact that 
the social world is in flux. Twentieth-century modernist city planning, as a result of its 
scientific, ahistorical plan, clashes with deeply historical conditions. Despite planners’ 
attempts to ‘rule by the plan’, the city resists being flattened to a set of numbers. 
Perhaps the greatest example is the city of Brasilia. Here, social engineering and spatial 
organization were brought into close alignment: the latter was believed to be facilitating 
the former (Holston, 1989). In particular, one quintessentially modernist tool was 
invoked in the project of organizing society: the master plan. The two-dimensional plan 
specifies, on a clean slate, physical elements such as housing units, recreational areas 
and public amenities. The clean slate hoped to produce a fresh, egalitarian landscape 
to neutralize class divisions and to ‘replace the chaos of the capitalist city with a new, 
predictable, and controllable beginning’ (ibid.: 58).
The modernist project is not limited to grand master plans exemplified by Le 
Corbusier’s Plan Voisin (Scott, 1998) and Lucio Costa’s Brasilia (Holston, 1989). In fact, 
the intervention can take various forms and often at smaller scales. In urban planning, 
intervention takes place more frequently in the minutiae of zoning, codes and ordi-
nances than in wholesale redevelopment. And it is planning at the exacting ‘genetic 
level’ that significantly shapes the city form (Marshall, 2012; Talen, 2012). Zoning is a 
classic example of state modernist calculation. It is premised on the notion that land 
can be classified in terms of function. To this end, zoning instruments (for example, 
maps, diagrams, codes, taxonomy and classification) are deployed to first calculate 
space, and then to rule over it. Recent inquiry has helpfully paid attention to the role 
of ‘calculation’ used in the government’s spatial intervention, exploring a variety of 
‘geographies of mathematization’, that is, geographical, spatial implications of numbers 
and calculation. Government calculations can be both quantitative and qualitative 
(Crampton and Elden, 2006). Quantitative calculations include Cartesian geometry, 
numbers, counting or mathematization of the subject. Qualitative calculation can take 
the form of ranking, ordering or organizing a group. This article benefits from this line 
of inquiry. I shall investigate both the qualitative and quantitative zoning calculations 
used to intervene in the space of Bangkok’s Chinatown.
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A few examples of zoning and mapping illustrate state calculations (and their 
limits). Mitchell’s (2002) important work on colonial Egypt explores the techno-
politics of land and natural resources. One such example is the cadastral map as a tool 
for colonial extraction of the country’s agrarian land. The cadastral map is constructed 
for a certain purpose: tax collection. The objects in the map are drawn in a way that 
conveniently facilitated that purpose. However, unlike their represented form, the real 
shape of land plots is never perfectly geometric, much less rectangular. Mitchell terms 
this process ‘reformatted knowledge’, as technicians manipulate mapmaking through 
‘wilful interference’ to produce a simple scheme of information to suit their purposes 
(ibid.: 106). Land is represented as a simple listing of information, such as ownership 
status and boundaries––that is, an itemization of quantifiable traits. Consequently, it 
dismisses the underpinning social relations, neglecting the broader agrarian transfor-
mations and the oft-contested histories behind that piece of land. As I show elsewhere 
(Rugkhapan, 2015), official mapmaking as willful inference can become willful vio-
lence when it chooses to see certain things and forego others. However, modernism 
has persisted long after colonialism. In the global South, Watson (2009a; 2009b) high -
lights the techno-managerial rationality, in which urban modernism still rules supreme. 
Importantly, the static blueprint conflicts with the indigenous pre-existing sociospatial 
relations. In her historical review of zoning in Durban, South Africa, during the apart-
heid and post-apartheid periods, Scott (2003) shows that modernist zoning maps 
were used to designate an industrial ‘productive zone’ imposed upon the town’s indige-
nous residential landscape. Modernist in character, zoning acquired its power from 
the semblance of being scientific and neutral. It minimized the ‘spatial unintelligi-
bility’,  namely, the largely informal and mixed-use land, transforming it so that it 
‘eventually closely resembled the plans that were developed through the planning 
process’ (ibid.: 258).
While modernist zoning is often associated with efficiency experiments, urban 
improvement and colonial exploitation during the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, it intervenes in a different policy area in the twenty-first century: urban sustain-
ability. Today, zoning and sustainability intersect. The former is believed to be a tool 
to promote the latter. For example, land use can be intensified to increase density. By 
manipulating zoning codes, it is believed, the city can be made more energy-efficient, 
less car-dependent and used intensively at its optimum (Charmes and Keil, 2015). 
Leffers and Ballamingie (2013) critique a series of recent intensification projects in 
Ottawa, Canada, showing how state institutions have been using zoning to discipline 
land towards the ideal of ‘highest and best use’. The ideal is translated to specific 
zoning techniques such as upzoning, increased height allowance and brownfield rede-
velopment. In this formulation, the authors argue, the language of intensification, 
density and ‘underdeveloped space’ frames land as being simply about density, which 
prompts entrepreneurial subjects to think about land explicitly in terms of space 
optimization when, in reality, community concerns surrounding the issue of land 
development are more numerous. Although urban planning has shifted to embrace 
more ‘postmodern’ urban concerns such as density and walkability, or diversity and 
variety (Ellin, 1999; Fainstein, 2005), the legacies of modernist thinking, namely, faith 
in scientific judgment and authoritative solutions, have been ingrained in the way plan-
ning is implemented.
The modernist planning interventions outlined above, from Brasilia to Ottawa, 
from Egypt to South Africa, are formulated in terms of a particular rationality: a 
causal rationality of spatial intervention. There is a belief that we can govern spaces 
by first problematizing their conditions and then finding deterministic solutions for 
them. Huxley (2006) reminds us of the importance of, first and foremost, unpacking 
the governmental rationality––implicit and explicit––behind any spatial intervention. 
This methodology inspires part three of the article. She suggests we examine how 
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certain ‘truths’ are produced and mobilized. Often, the underlying logic that connects 
‘problematization’ and ‘solution’ is that there is a causal relation between space/envi-
ronment and bodies/comportments––that is, there can be prescriptive, linear effects 
of space on subjectivities, assuming that space can shape comportments (ibid.: 774). 
In urban planning, causal rationality is exemplified by the belief that cities can and 
should be planned in particular ways in order to warrant desirable subjects, behaviors 
and spaces.
Zoning for sustainability
The 2013 zoning plan is the greenest plan of Bangkok. In it, the BMA substan-
tially revised the ten Planning Objectives (POs) of the previous zoning plan, modifying 
these to convey environmentalist focus (see BMA, 2006: 3; 2013: 2–3). In what I call 
the greening of POs, the BMA made a stronger connection between each PO and 
its urban environmental implications (see Table 1). For example, an emphasis on 
convenience and efficiency is added to the Transportation PO; job–housing balance and 
travel–trip reduction was added to the Housing PO; environment-friendly industries 
were included in the Manufacturing PO; urban growth management and compactness 
were added to the Agriculture PO. Moreover, two new POs, 11 and 12, were added. 
These two new objectives––the objective on natural disasters and the objective on 
global warming––similarly point to the explicit environmental policy concern of the 
latest zoning plan. With these sustainability vocabularies permeating its production, 
the 2013 zoning plan is clearly environmentalist, suggesting the city’s new awareness 
of and commitment to the broader global agenda of urban sustainability (BMA, 2013: 
2–3).
We understand discourse by studying its enactment. Thus, if the aforemen-
tioned POs attest to the vision that underwrites the new zoning plan, zoning tech-
niques are prescribed to realize such a vision. This article focuses, in turn, on two 
zoning techniques and their underlying rationality. First, I investigate the government’s 
attempt to segregate land in terms of its functional land use category, for example, com-
mercial, residential or industrial. Each category is further subdivided or subcategorized 
to reflect the position of a given zone within the city’s larger hierarchy. Second, I discuss 
the BMA’s experiment with a fashionable planning idea––transit-oriented development 
(TOD). The city government wants to make TODs sprout up by ‘upzoning’––by 
increasing density around every metro station.
table 1 The ‘greening’ of Planning Objectives
Planning Objective 2006 Zoning Plan 2013 Zoning Plan
Planning Objective 5
(Transportation)
Support mass transit and connect 
transportation networks
Support convenience, speed, and safety by 




Improve and rehabilitate 
residential areas and urban 
centers
Improve job and housing balance in order to reduce 
trips by improving and rehabilitating inner-city 
residential areas and developing suburban centers
Planning Objective 7
(Manufacturing)
Support high-skill, high-tech 
industries that are safe and free 
of pollution
Support manufacturing industries that do not 
affect urban environment, and high-skill, high-tech 
industries that are safe and free of pollution
Planning Objective 8
(Agriculture)
Retain farmland Retain farmland through compact urban 
development and growth management
Planning Objective 11
(Disaster management)




- Address global warming by reducing energy use and 
increasing green space to reduce carbon emissions
SOURCES: BMA (2006; 2013)
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— Land use subcategories
Issued in 1992 and 1999, respectively, the first two zoning plans of Bangkok 
were rather crude. The taxonomy of land use categories was limited to a few basic 
categories, such as residential, commercial and industrial (BMA, 1992; 1999). For exam-
ple, in the first zoning plan for Bangkok issued in 1992, a total of 62 areas were zoned 
as ‘commercial’ (BMA, 1992). This simplified plan did not distinguish scale. The regu-
lations for the 62 zones were the same, despite remarkable differences in size and 
character. The BMA adopted this simplified scheme from the Department of Town 
and Country Planning, Thailand’s national agency for planning. However, the national 
standards intended for Thai towns and cities proved to be too coarse for the capital city.1 
In preparation for the third zoning map of 2006, then, the BMA commissioned a study 
for new planning standards. It tailored these to better suit Bangkok’s land use, which 
had grown increasingly complex over the past few decades (BMA, 2005). 
A major addition was a scheme to subcategorize each land use zone. Subcate-
gorization is a device for fine-tuning the land use plan to existing land use types. The 
example below illustrates the subcategorization of ‘C’ or ‘commercial’ land use zones 
(BMA, 2013: 4–5):
•	 C-1: small, suburban commercial centers (general residential suburban areas)
•	 C-2: suburban centers of business, housing and employment (potential sub-
urban growth areas)
•	 C-3: general central business districts (CBDs)
•	 C-4: sub-central business districts around major rail nodes (park-and-ride 
areas)
•	 C-5: regional and international commercial centers.
Land use subcategorization is formulated under a particular logic: scalar think-
ing. The classification of land into land use classes is part of functionalist thought. Land 
is, first and foremost, assumed to be functional. A given zone is supposed to have an 
identifiable function––residential, commercial, industrial––and to duly perform that 
designated function. Secondly, the subcategorization of zones as, for example, C-1, C-2 
or C-3 is not only functionalist, but also scalar. It is a hierarchical way of organizing the 
city. The subcategorized zone reflects its role vis-à-vis the city (BMA, 2005: 5–99). In 
this manner, the C-1 zone, the suburban commercial center, caters for the day-to-day 
basic provision of goods and services in the suburbs. C-2 functions as a larger suburban 
area with a more diverse range of commercial services. C-3 is a CBD, catering not only 
for its immediate communities but also for the city’s residents at large. C-4 acts as a 
park-and-ride node that supports the economic functions of the areas around the major 
rail stations. And finally, C-5 is Bangkok’s downtown core. The same logic applies to 
other land use classes. For example, residential zones are subcategorized according to 
density as low-density, medium-density and high-density.
Subcategorization as a device, I argue, is an attempt to produce functional ana-
logues across the city. Currently, the zoning map designates 20 C-1 zones, 5 C-2 zones, 
43 C-3 zones, 5 C–4 zones and 7 C–5 zones, which are distributed around Bangkok 
(see Figure 1a). From the city planners’ point of view, since these areas perform similar 
commercial functions, they are treated as analogous and regarded as perfectly identical. 
For example, a suburb on the city’s northern fringe and, say, its southern counterpart 
are viewed as analogous C-1 zones because, in terms of function, they both act as 
suburban commercial centers. Likewise, two highly trafficked districts are viewed as 
comparable CBDs or C-3 zones if they function like one (that is, they are large enough 
to cater for a wide array of goods and services). Moreover, since these zones are viewed 
1 Interview with a senior BMA planner, 16 February 2015.
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as analogous, they are thought be governable by the same regulations. The zoning 
plan, then, proceeds to prescribe an identical set of zoning requirements (for example, 
permissible and prohibited land use activities; height and development intensity).
— Zoning for transit-oriented development (TOD)
The second addition to Bangkok’s zoning is upzoning: an increased density for 
areas surrounding transit stations. Motivated by the concept of transit-oriented devel-
opment (TOD) popularized in Western cities to promote compact urbanism (Cervero 
et al., 2002), the BMA, too, has adopted the concept rather enthusiastically as a poten tial 
figure 2 Illustration of the proposed 500-meter radii of density upzoning around 
future transit stations; the star marks the location of Chinatown station (source: TURCI, 
2015)
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cure for the city’s urbanization problems. I locate Bangkok’s newfound preference 
for ‘urban density’ in two contexts. One is the historical-domestic context of the city’s 
long-entrenched urbanization problems. The other is the contemporary-international 
policy climate of urban sustainability. The latter, city planners hope, will help cure the 
former. In line with the revised POs, the adoption of TOD aims at forging more dense 
and compact urban development––an urban form that is internationally praised for its 
promising potential to contain sprawl.
Density is thus seen as a vehicle for achieving compact urban form, as an ena b-
ling techne (Legg, 2006; 2007) that can direct people towards where they should live and 
work: the transit node. In particular, the preparation of the zoning plans of 2006 and 
2013 coincided with the expansion of Bangkok’s metro lines. Therefore, the vision of rail-
based city life seemed particularly alluring. The planners of the zoning maps responded 
quite enthusiastically to this vision. Their faith in density (on a conceptual level) was thus 
translated on a technical level into one particular zoning technique: that of increased 
density around transit stations to forge the emergence of a TOD node. Development 
projects––residential, commercial or office space––with a total floor area of over 10,000 
square meters is now permissible, if not encouraged, on condition that the development 
be located within a 500-meter radius of a metro station. Land parcels within the 
500-meter radius are now appraised as being walkable. These are deemed appropriate 
to accommodate growth and are thus upzoned for more intensive use (see Figure 3). 
Conceived in this manner, the zoning map is therefore a tool of visibility (Legg, 2006; 
2007): it makes the land surrounding a transit station on the map visible in terms of 
land use density. In turn, density became a numerical value that could be increased, 
decreased or arithmetically manipulated at will.
The technical rationality that underpins Bangkok’s enthusiastic adoption of 
the TOD zoning is the belief that walkable environments will lead to fewer car trips. 
Following Huxley (2006), I propose that the assumed causal connection between the 
TOD zoning and car dependence needs systematic dissecting. First, the geometry of a 
500-meter radius is designated a ‘walkable’ distance. Buildings and activities within 
the 500-meter radius, the reasoning goes, are accessible from the transit station. By 
upzoning or increasing the development density around the metro station on the zoning 
map, planners can therefore create a canvas that is conducive to creating walkable, 
mixed-use environments that will, in turn, allow people to live, work and play therein. 
As a result, there will be less need for cars, since people can rely on the conveniently 
located transit stop as their main means of transportation and on nearby facilities as 
destinations in themselves. It is in this cause–effect reasoning that TOD zoning has 
been inserted into Bangkok’s zoning maps. The logic behind Bangkok’s TOD zoning is 
one of spatial causality, whereby space, if properly governed, is able to direct a certain 
desired behavioral outcome.
figure 3 Illustration of a FAR (floor-area ratio) of 7:1 and a FAR of 2:1 (assuming a 
building coverage ratio of 1:1) (source: author’s rendition)
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Unseeing Chinatown
What is the experience of the two zoning techniques––land use subcategoriza-
tion and TOD zoning––when they are translated on the ground? In this section I use 
Chinatown as an interface of policy translation (Watson, 2009b)––the arena in which 
the technical plan is put into practice. As will be shown, the interface opens up the space 
of Chinatown as a site of technocratic struggle. By way of introduction, Chinatown is 
zoned as C-3 (major central business district) (see Figure 1b). The stipulated floor-to-
area ratio (FAR) is 7:1, meaning that the allowable total of a given building’s developable 
floor space is seven times that of the plot on which the building stands. By comparison, 
the highest FAR for zone C-5, Bangkok’s downtown core, is 10:1 (BMA, 2013). Also, 
a new metro station is under construction near Wat Mangkon, a famous Chinese 
shrine located in the heart of Charoen Krung Road, one of the oldest Chinese areas of 
Bangkok. Therefore, TOD zoning applies to the areas within a 500-meter radius of Wat 
Mangkon metro station (see Figure 3). In the next subsection I discuss these two zoning 
techniques and their impact on the space of Chinatown.
— Chinatown as a land use subcategory
In formulating a land use subcategory, the BMA selected one ‘prototypical dis-
trict’ to represent the other districts in that subcategory (BMA, 2005). For subcategory 
C-3, Samyan was selected as the prototype to represent Bangkok’s other CBDs. Founded 
in the 1960s, Samyan is a market neighborhood comprising commercial blocks located 
close to Chulalongkorn University, its main driver of growth. Samyan is a commercial 
and mixed-use district. It is characterized by various types of trade, ranging from wet 
markets to used auto parts. For the purposes of Bangkok’s planning standards, Samyan 
was profiled in terms of its function––existing land use types, population density and 
building dimensions such as building use, height and FAR. These numbers were drawn 
out and tabulated to portray the functional character of Samyan. In turn, Samyan is no 
longer an urban district in itself. Rather, Samyan has been abstracted to a statistical 
figure. This abstract figure, in turn, represents the other functionally equivalent C-3 
zones.
Does the label C-3 represent the experience of Chinatown, commercial or 
other wise? Certainly, designating Chinatown as commercial is sound, if not common-
sensical. Indeed, Chinatown has always been a major trading district of Bangkok since 
its early history in the late eighteenth century. Today, Chinatown is the site of various 
retail and wholesale businesses, cottage industries, restaurants and food outlets. Goods 
and services in Chinatown range from gold shops to textile stores, from auto repair 
services to rice storage godowns. Thus, in terms of land use, Chinatown is certainly 
commercial in character. Also, in terms of its role vis-à-vis the city, Chinatown firmly 
constitutes one of Bangkok’s many CBDs or C-3 zones, as it caters for both district-level 
and city-level residents.
However, there are at least two problems with the conception of the subcat-
egory  C-3: limits of generalization and standardization, and severe omission of its 
history. Let us recall that subcategory C-3 is a standardized figure based on (1) the 
daytime population of the area (labor in the trade and business sector) and (2) its 
extrapolated projection (BMA, 2005: 5–103). Chinatown is a counterargument to 
these calculations.
First, the daytime labor population ignores ‘other populations’ such as tourists 
and migrant workers who occupy the space of Chinatown, traversing it throughout 
the day. The static daytime population does not account for these popu lations, which 
may well be transient, yet are instrumental in bringing about the spatial qualities of the 
‘bustling, chaotic Chinatown’, which make it differ markedly from its prototype, Samyan, 
and other C-3 business zones. Chinatown is the second most dense district of Bangkok. 
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Its population density of 18,615 people per square kilometer is substantially larger than 
that of other C-3 zones, such as Pathumwan (6,160 people per square kilometer) and 
Bang Khen (4,526 people per square kilometer) (BMA, 2014a: 4). Moreover, the daytime 
population makes a temporal assumption about the zone, consigning a certain space to 
a certain time. For example, commercial zones C-1 to C-5 calculations are all based on 
these zones’ daytime populations. This suggests the role of the zone as employment 
sites for labor and workers during the day. By contrast, residential zones R-1 to R-10 use 
figures for night-time populations, assuming that these zones are places of residence 
after work. However, unlike many other C-3 business districts that die down after 
working hours, night-time Chinatown takes on a different profile. At night, Chinatown 
is characterized by small eateries, sidewalk vendors, pedestrians and tourists, who start 
taking over Yaowarat, the main artery of Chinatown, as night falls. Chinatown shifts 
from a daytime place of trade and commerce to a more leisurely nighttime district. It is 
this shift, this ebb and flow of population, that is omitted in the current categorization.
Second, flawed technical generalization aside, a more serious issue is the 
omission of, and disrespect for, the area’s history. There is a whole commercial history 
of Chinatown that the ‘commercial zone’, at best, fails to fully consider or, at worst, 
misrepresents. One important question arises here: are two similarly designated zones 
really comparable or ‘analogous’, as the zoning map seeks to suggest––that is, do all of 
the 43 C-3 zones, which include Samyan, the 200-year-old Chinatown, the modern-
downtown Sukhumvit and the eastern subcenter of Bang Kapi, to name a few, share 
similarities, functional or otherwise? Chinatown is an old district. By the eighteenth 
century, Chinese traders had settled in what is modern-day Bangkok, occupying the 
swampy areas east of the Chao Phraya River (Skinner, 1957; Næ- ngnō i Saksī, 1991; 
Sirikulchayanont, 2009). In the wake of trade liberalization in the mid-nineteenth 
century, modern streets were constructed. The streets later became the locus of immi-
grant Chinese urban space. In this part of Bangkok, Chinese commercial practices are 
reflected in the built environment: the rice godowns, the Chinese shrines, the shops, 
as well the medical clinics and dispensaries. This is by no means an exhaustive review 
of Chinese immigrant history: suffice it to say that place-specific practices produce 
place-specific typologies. As I shall show below, this ‘difference’ provides a basis for 
contesting the zoning map.
The FAR allowance is a case in point. The zoning plan stipulates a FAR factor 
of seven for all the CBDs (BMA, 2013: 41) (see Figure 4). Again, the inten tion is to 
upzone or to promote density. However, the floor space allowance contrasts dra-
matically with existing settlement patterns and building typologies (see Figure 5). 
Rather than a Western-style CBD filled with tall office blocks, the ‘commer cial’ 
nature of Chinatown takes on a different physical form. Chinatown is a low-rise 
district characterized by two- to four-story shophouses (see Figures 5a to 5d). There-
fore, the existing FAR factor ranges between 1.03 to 3.91. For example, the neighbor-
hoods of Charoen Chai and Woeng Nakhonkhasem have a current FAR factor of 2.19 
and 2.04, respectively (Pimonsathean, 2009; TURCI, 2015: 1–45). In fact, as an old 
dis trict, Chinatown is mostly built up. Its building density has changed very little in 
the past decade. One BMA-commissioned survey, conducted 15 years ago, reports an 
average FAR of 2.02 (KMITL, 2001, Chapter 4: 3). In my archival search through recent 
planning applications, I found that, between 2010 and 2014, the District Office pro-
cessed approximately 8 to 24 building permit applications per year, and almost all 
of these applications were for two- to four-story buildings.2 Therefore, in order to 
ful fill  the universal vision of a C-3 CBD, the desired FAR factor of seven presumes a 
2 Records of Building Construction Permits, Public Works Division, Saphanthawong District Office, 2010–2014; in 
these years, applications were received for 3 three-story, 36 two-story, 55 three-story, 34 four-story, and three five-
story buildings.
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demolish-then-redevelop approach to current building stock. As I will show below, the 
approach favors the landlord.
Contestations arose: residents felt that the abstract C-3 label did not reflect 
their version of reality. In 2012, two Chinatown communities submitted petition cases, 
and their letters illuminate the nature of the contestation. The first was Charoen Chai, 
an old Chinese neighborhood on Charoen Krung Road. In their motion letter, signed 
by 42 residents, Charoen Chai petitioned that its zoning color be changed from ‘red’ 
to ‘light-brown’, or from ‘commercial’ to ‘historic preservation’ land use.3 The motion 
explains the long history of their settlement. In particular, they call attention to the 
old buildings, which date back to the reign of King Rama V (1868–1910). These build ings, 
they argue, are of historical and architectural value, and should actually be pro tected 
under the National Act on Ancient Monuments. To support the claim, the movants 
enclosed a hand-drawn cadastral map documenting the age of each building in the 
3 Motion No. 13-8, Motion Compilation Book, BMA (2012).
figure 4 Settlement patterns in Chinatown; the darker shading represents significant 
buildings, identified as having potential heritage value (source: TURCI, 2015) 
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neigh borhood as part of their plea for serious reconsideration. The movants thus used 
the age of buildings as evidence to add weight to their appeal, establishing detail in the 
face of a comprehensive plan that lacked fine-grained resolution. Another Chinatown 
neighborhood, Weong Nakhonkhasem, submitted a similar motion to the BMA, calling 
for change from ‘commercial land use’ to ‘commercial land use with historic significance’. 
The movants also demanded that the FAR factor be reduced.4 Their motion claimed 
that the high FAR factor ignored the historical value of the district, which dates back 
to the reign of King Rama V (1868–1910). Worse yet, the FAR incentivized speculation 
and land grabbing. The movants also argued that once it came into effect, the new zon-
ing plan would ‘open up opportunities for demolition, accelerating the rapid disappear-
ance of the nation’s historical roots’.5
The BMA dismissed both motions. In the preamble, the planners did acknowl -
edge the historical and architectural value of both Charoen Chai and Weong Nak-
honkhasem. They acknowledged that the two communities are nationally famous, 
historical commercial districts that should be ‘commemorated as national heritage for 
later generations to study and take pride in’. Yet, as tenement housing, the BMA argued, 
the rental buildings had been left ‘dilapidated due to lack of care’.6 The BMA proceeded 
to dismiss the motions on two grounds. First, the two areas functioned as ‘commercial 
zones catering for city-level services, and have high population densities’, and have 
always been ‘zoned commercial in the previous zoning plans’.7 Second, the Building 
Ordinance of 1999, the BMA suggested, was already in place to protect and control 
4 Motion No. 13-10, Motion Compilation Book, BMA (2012).
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Motions No. 13-8 and 13-10, Motion Compilation Book, BMA (2012).
figure 5 These four photographs show the two main characteristics of building 
typologies in Chinatown: (1) they are low-rise and (2) built in a row (photos by the 
author)
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building height within the areas: 16 meters around temples, and 37 meters for the rest of 
the areas. The decisions, although made separately for each motion, invoked the same 
rationale and cited the same legal precedents. I will come back to critically discuss 
both in part five. For now, these decisions were upheld by the Planning Advisory Board 
without further comment.8 The residents obviously lamented the decisions. Although 
historical preservation is listed high as one of the official POs in the zoning map (PO 
9), one resident contests that zoning only ‘preserves’ what it designates ‘historic 
preservation land use’, namely, Rattanakosin Island, the only historic preservation 
zone in the entire city of Bangkok (see Figure 1b). Therefore, the official definition of 
‘historic preservation’, she argues, is severely inadequate, because it is too narrowly 
defined around one historical district, ejecting ‘other [historical] parts that have made 
up the city’ from official preservation concerns.9
— Chinatown as a calculable density
If the C-3 label is an abstract category, the 500-meter TOD zoning is an 
abstract geometry. Unlike the actual construction of the metro station, for which a 
preliminary engineering survey had to be conducted to determine its feasibility, no 
survey was conducted for the walkable areas surrounding each of the stations. Instead, 
it was assumed. The assumed radius of walkability was rationalized on the basis of the 
Planning Department’s GIS map. This meant that a circle is drawn, quite literally, around 
every metro station platform to designate the zone of walkability and thus determine 
the higher-density areas (see Figure 3). Similarly, the map is also used for planning 
interpretation (BMA, 2014b). To determine whether or not a given structure lies within 
the radius, the circular extent of the walkable radius is to be strictly calculated on the 
basis of the official GIS interface alone. The BMA requires that the distance between 
a building and the metro station be measured only on the official construction blue-
print of each metro station, not from the actual site itself, or from the actual experience 
of walking to the metro station (BMA, 2014a). The planners measure a location based 
on its numerical length from the station, thus alienating other experiential qualities of 
the walkable TOD that they seek to promote in the first place.
The TOD zoning caused quite a ripple across Bangkok’s real-estate market. 
With a higher developable density comes a higher land price. In anticipation of the 2013 
zoning map, land speculation around current and future metro stations skyrocketed as 
investors, real estate agents and owners sought to capitalize on their now prime loca-
tions. In Chinatown, the 500-meter TOD zoning has led to a series of eviction cases and 
shortened leases. Motivated by the new prospects of profitable development, landlords 
want to turn their properties into high-density developments or sell their titles to other 
developers. They have already begun, quite abruptly and in many cases without prior 
notice, to shorten lease periods from three years to one year, and recently to month-by-
month, or have terminated leases altogether.10
The TOD zoning is being strongly contested by the residents of Chinatown, 
who, as tenants of their current residences, fear that the zoning provisions will result 
in demolition and evictions, thus undermining their housing security. The residents 
criticize this looming threat on their areas, asserting that planners did not see their 
area’s historic significance. The most vocal critics are from the neighborhood of 
Charoen Chai, which is located right around the upcoming metro station. Here, I will 
briefly describe their narrative of contention. Residents’ main contention is planners’ 
8 Ibid.; ibid.
9 Comments raised at the public forum Rue mueangkao rakngao rao cha yu trong nai [Demolishing the Old Town, 
where will our historical roots be?], Bangkok, 5 August 2012.
10 Based on an article in the Bangkok Post by P. Atthakor, published on 2 November 2012), entitled ‘Preservation pleas 
falling on deaf ears’, available at http://www.bangkokpost.com (accessed 18 May 2015).
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ignorance of the neighborhood’s spatial history in at least three aspects: formation 
history, collective identity and trade patterns. As an old neighborhood that has existed 
for over one hundred years, Charoen Chai has been home to four or five generations of 
Thai Chinese families. Its historical, cultural and architectural heritage can be traced 
back to the economy of Charoen Krung Road, the first modern street built in Bangkok 
after the mid-nineteenth-century trade liberalization. Upon completion of the road in 
1864, shophouses were built to accommodate a modern form of trade. Soon after this, 
at least five Chinese shrines were built around the Charoen Chai neighborhood. These 
shrines were, and still are, the center of Chinese spiritual life overseas and represents 
the epitome of Chinese collective identity.11 Chinese spiritual life extended far beyond 
a religious space: it is also a space of social gathering, self-help and Chinese medical 
care, as at this time such basic needs were extremely short supply for early Chinese 
immigrants. Owing to the proximity to the shrines, the neighborhood of Charoen Chai 
developed a particular kind of space: an agglomeration of Chinese ritual-merchandise 
stores and small eating houses. In what economists call agglomeration economies, 
Charoen Chai boasts the largest of its kind in Thailand. Here Thais of Chinese descent 
can find all sorts of products that celebrate Chinese rites of passage ‘from birth to death’, 
some of which can no longer even be found in China itself after the Cultural Revo-
lution.12 Similarly, like most Chinatowns in Southeast Asia (Jackson, 1975), the dense 
concentration of eateries are a relic of Chinatown’s past as a site of constant, labor-
intensive activities. This is exemplified by the well-known ‘laborer’s noodle shop’,13 a 
popular spot among Bangkok food pilgrims, named for its cheap prices and the large 
portions that were served to the Chinese laborers of the past. Another example is the 
old building of a well-respected Chinese physician, which bears the name Sow Li and is 
located a few steps from the metro station. In Teochew Chinese, sow means to help, and 
li means people or the masses. Thus its name refers back to the public-health conditions 
of the time and to the shortage of medical care for Chinese immigrants (CCRG, nd). This 
reconstructed and somewhat romantic account reflects a spatial history that emerged 
from the symbiotic relationship between Charoen Chai and its surrounding economies.
However, despite their elaborate narrative, Charoen Chai residents have seen 
their local history denied. In its dismissal of the residents’ petition to revoke the 500- 
meter density provisions, the BMA claims that the Building Ordinance of 1999 is already 
in place to restrict building height to 37 meters, suggesting that this Ordinance prohibits 
overly high buildings. However, I want to highlight that while a large-scale project of 
over 10,000 square meters cannot take the form of a tall, vertical structure, it may very 
well be built horizontally. Thus, instead of building a high-rise building of 10,000 square 
meters, the landowners could build a low-rise structure by redeveloping adjacent 
plots into one big project. This is where the unintended politics of technical rationality 
comes in. The 500-meter radius conveniently plays into the hands of Chinatown land-
lords who tend to already possess a large number of contiguous land parcels in the first 
place. The entire row of Charoen Chai shophouses, for example, are owned by Chumbot 
Pantip Foundation, a foundation of a grandchild of King Rama V. Similarly, across the 
street, the Plaeng Nam neighborhood is owned by the Crown Property Bureau (which 
is preparing redevelopment plans there too). The Chumbot Pantip Foundation has 
terminated its leases, allowing tenants to rent on a month-by-month basis that requires 
them to move out upon receiving notice. Failure to do so would result in a fine, per day, 
of one month’s rent. To make matters worse, Charoen Chai neighborhood is tucked 
11 These comments were raised during the panel discussion Yankao lao krung: thima thipai lae kwamplianplaeng 
kong yan tangtang nai krungthep tungtae adit tueng pachuban [Old districts recount stories: backgrounds and 
change in Bangkok’s old districts from past to present], Bangkok, 9 April 2014.
12 Ibid.
13 บะหมี่จับกับ (bami chapkang) in Thai.
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between two metro stations located 700 meters apart. One resident suggests that 
‘everything here [in between the two stations] is evictable’, circling her finger around 
Charoen Chai’s location on the map (see Figure 3).14
Let me share a few other examples that refute technical objectivity. In one 
public forum, one attendee dismissed altogether the objective basis of the TOD density 
zon ing,  arguing that the metro and the TOD zoning are not naturally a catalyst for 
demolition.15 Instead, he questioned the role of human choice in producing what is 
otherwise passed as a technical calculation. The decision to increase density, he argues, 
descended directly from the ‘vision of the people who laid out the actual plan’ and ‘it 
is ultimately up to those people whether they see this area as a preservation area or a 
cultural space or not. It has little to do with the metro’. In fact, there are at least five 
counterarguments against objectivity. First, in one of my interviews, a senior planner 
confirmed the role of human decision in the deliberation process of the Chinatown 
planning motions. As a rule, the zoning provisions are intended to be, he reveals, a 
‘comprehensive plan for the entire city’. Therefore, where there is a metro station, the 
TOD zoning would follow as an automatic condition. An exemption for the Chinatown 
station, he adds, is technically possible, but it would constitute an ‘exception, thus 
violating the standards’. Second, when I asked about the rationale behind the specific 
figure of 500 meters (as opposed to, say, 400 or 600, or 450 or 550 meters, or any other 
imaginable figure), two planners both claimed this distance to be an international 
standard used by major cities in the world. Third, they admitted, however, that real-
estate parties had submitted requests for a radius as large as 1,000 meters. Fourth, the 
planners also added that, given Bangkok’s tropical climate, a shorter radius of perhaps 
300 meters would have been more appropriate and ‘walkable’.16 And fifth, the BMA 
did make an exception for the historical district, exempting it from the TOD zoning 
(BMA, 2013: 62–65). My point is that numbers are pliable. Their plasticity can therefore 
be manipulated. There is little objectivity beyond the round numbers. These various 
judgments suggest the salient role of subjective human choice, which contradicts the 
objective claim to ‘universal application’.
Encountering a space of difference: a thin category and a careless geometry
This section tries to conceptualize a space of difference in relation to the prob-
lematic universalism of zoning. Chinatown exemplifies a poor fit between simplified 
bureaucratic containers and the complex thing we call land. It is clear that the sub-
categorizations C-1, C-2, C-3 represent an important planning novelty for Bangkok, 
showing planners’ heightened sensitivity to a wide variety of economic needs and func-
tions. The planners duly recognize that the ‘commercial zone’ is not monolithic: not 
all commercial zones serve the same scales and purposes. However, such recognition 
remains a functionalist one. As land is viewed as an entity that can and should perform 
one discretely prescribed function, land is cast as land use. City dwellers are cast as 
‘producers’ and ‘users’ of goods and services in a particular piece of land.
Within such an impoverished formulation, zoning causes misalignments 
because it cannot accommodate particularity. First, the C-3 category presents a prob-
lem for both space and time. Despite being true for a certain time at a certain place 
(namely, the prototypical Samyam), it is used to regulate the experience of the cen-
tral commercial districts everywhere and at all times. Therefore, while the recent 
zoning maps are sensitive to commercial stratification, they are blind to the multiple 
particularities of each of the zones, negating their internal variations and subsuming 
14 Interview, 30 April 2015.
15 Comments raised at the public forum Rue mueangkao rakngao rao cha yu trong nai [Demolishing the Old Town, 
where will our historical roots be?], Bangkok, 5 August 2012
16 Interview, 18 August 2015.
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them under a standardized category. Chinatown residents’ pleas for a change from 
‘commercial land use’ to ‘historic preservation land use’ or to ‘commercial land use 
with historic significance’ suggest another depth of commercial experience. Secondly, 
as the zoning map seeks to join zones into a larger order, it ignores the local order. By 
inserting the zones into the citywide hierarchy of needs, the zoning map decouples 
the zone from its immediate context, from other aspects of the complex thing we call 
land. The aforementioned interviews and public forums indicate that residents’ conten-
tions point to other land-based claims that are both symbolic (for example, historical 
identity, values and place attachment) and material (for example, livelihoods and 
housing security). These claims to space suggest that there are more issues surround-
ing a zone than its naked function, that there is more to land than land use. Land use 
is a poor arbiter of land, for the thinness of the former does not provide enough room, 
technical and ethical, to mediate the complex phenomenon of the latter, which is 
historically tied to occupational livelihoods, communal cohesion, individual attach-
ments and the general will and right to dwell.
Similarly, the TOD zoning is a result of technical rationalization. It involves a 
high degree of space–behavior determinism. Despite the unresolved empirical effec-
tive ness of TOD (Cervero et al., 2002; Canepa, 2007) and despite the fact that no 
prior feasibility studies had been conducted, such hopeful yet naive rationalization 
led the BMA to approvingly underwrite the TOD zoning. However, the map’s blank 
surface that planners worked with belies the land’s more complex urban geography. 
Intended as a well-meaning intervention, the 500-meter TOD zoning became a careless 
geometry upon implementation. I use the term ‘careless’ not in an accusatory but 
rather in an analytical way. The geometry, I argue, does not care for two conditions of 
Chinatown: sociospatial forms and housing tenure. First, high density encourages an 
architectural form that is at odds with the preexisting sociospatial forms. The dense 
urban form that TOD zoning desires––the string of intensely built nodes along a transit 
line––contrasts with Chinatown’s low-rise rows of shophouses (see Figure 4). There 
is a worrying contrast between the way in which zoning is administered and the way 
the neighborhood space of Chinatown is formed. Zoning treats a land parcel as an 
individual unit of calculable density. It views a discrete building as an appropriate site 
of intervention. However, the historical emergence of land subdivision in this part of 
town is collective and mutually constituting, as exemplified by the building typologies 
and the agglomerate economies.
Second, and more importantly, although TOD claims neutrality in its universal 
application (which I refuted earlier), not everyone has the same agency to act upon 
the hoped-for density. The occupant of a residence is not necessarily the owner of the 
property. In this regard, the TOD zoning fails to see one important aspect of Chinatown: 
housing tenure. The zoning map assumes an even, equal field of privately held land, 
but in reality, historical landlord–tenant relations exist. There are deeply entrenched, 
strategic land interests that are waiting to act upon opportunities. Only around half of 
Chinatown (55.31%) is freehold, owned by a few private individuals. The rest of the 
area constitutes leasehold from major landowners, for example, the Crown Property 
Bureau, temples, state agencies and single private individuals (KMITL, 2001: 3–30). 
The area known as Chinatown was considered undeveloped ‘suburban’ land in the late 
eighteenth century. As the land was sparsely populated and thus considered abundant 
until the late nineteenth century (Ouyyanont and Sajjanand, 2001), past monarchs gave 
it away quite freely to their princes and princesses and to their aristocrats. Following 
the trade liberalization in the mid-nineteenth century, these members of the nobility, 
in turn, leased out their properties to Chinese traders. These historical tenure patterns 
have persisted to this day. Four major neighborhoods in Chinatown, namely, Woeng 
Nakhonkhasem, Charoen Chai, Loen Rit and Plaeng Nam, are all owned by these landed 
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elites.17 Thus, a novel planning intervention that claims to benefit all in fact opens up 
opportunities only for a certain group of people: the owners of density. Density should 
therefore not simply be represented by numerical figures or by calculating housing 
units per land unit. Narrowly conceived, density not only signifies poor understanding 
of fraught housing tenure relationships, but also serves to justify eviction. An environ-
mentally progressive policy such as urban density, carelessly formulated and hastily 
executed, ends up producing a socially retrograde effect.
Conclusion
This article advances two arguments. First, the zoning techniques of land use 
subcategorization and TOD zoning are formulated through the abstract devices of 
classification, hierarchization and linear rationalization of cause and effect. Second, 
limits of such devices are, in turn, exposed when they are imposed upon a space of 
difference fraught with its own history and contested land tenure. Well-meaning 
but ill-informed, zoning forgoes histories. It unsees other aspects of land beyond its 
function and density. My argument is not that land is too complex to be reduced to 
zones (maybe it is), or that every space is different (maybe it is). Rather, my argument is 
that such difference is actively unseen under the banner of technical science of urban 
improvement.
The most worrying concern here is that, despite being a human choice, the 
functionalist-universalist interpretation wins. The way in which planners dismissed 
the planning motions submitted by Chinatown residents points to how technical 
rationality trumps other ways of seeing. The planners’ justifications are based on their 
confined perception of Chinatown’s commercial function and its role within the larger 
city. To view Chinatown as an area of ‘commercial land use’ is to privilege functional 
similarity over differences. Similarly, the decision not to exempt Chinatown from TOD 
zoning is based on upholding the universal application of standards. My purpose here is 
not to point out what is rhetorically obvious: that the particular will always be different 
from the universal or vice versa. Rather, my purpose is to highlight the undue weight of 
zoning in Bangkok (and Thailand). Certainly, high-density zoning in Lower Manhattan 
caused an uproar in the Chinatown of New York in the 1980s. However, residents there 
managed to successfully challenge this imposition through various means, such as local 
groups and court appeals (Lin, 1998: 150–56). By contrast, in Bangkok––a city that lacks 
appeal mechanisms and that equates planning with zoning––the zoning plan, abstract 
as it is, is used as the only source of authority, the ultimate truth, and the sole basis on 
which planners arbitrate dissent.
Universal zoning is often viewed as an urban planning specter of the twentieth 
century. Chinatown itself has been studied as a site of modernist interventions such as 
clearance and demolition (Anderson, 1991; Yeoh and Kong, 1994). However, modernist 
zoning is alive and well as we progress into the twenty-first century to battle new 
urban imperatives. Sustainability and many related concepts such as resilience and 
compactness are touted as the goals of contemporary urban planning. The lesson 
from Bangkok shows that the very means for achieving such a difficult end can be a 
dangerously facile one. Despite its commendable recognition of new urban problems, 
the new zoning still remains rigid in character. Modernist city planning in Bangkok does 
not have at its disposal postmodern planning vocabularies, or the kind of vocabularies 
that recognize difference. As such, every space in the vast city, including Chinatown, 
and Little India, for that matter, is filtered through thin grids and careless geometries.
17 Woeng Nakhonkhasem is now owned by TCC Land Company, and Charoen Chai by the Chumbot Pantip Foundation, 
while Loen Rit and Plaeng Nam are owned by the Crown Property Bureau.
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